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Building	on	the	investigation	of	the	Charity	Commission	(2009)	on	the	effects	of	the	
economic	downturn	on	the	largest	trusts	and	foundation	in	the	United	Kingdom,	the	
purpose	of	this	research	was	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	Australian	trusts	and	
foundations	were	taking	an	actively	strategic	approach	to	their	investments	and	pursuit	
of	mission	(including	grant-making),	and	the	relationship	between	the	two	in	the	context	
of	the	economic	downturn.	Focus	was	given	to	identifying	the	issues	raised	as	a	
consequence	of	the	economic	downturn,	rather	than	providing	a	generalised	snapshot		
of	the	‘average’	foundations	response.	
In	September	2009,	semi-structured,	in	depth	interviews	were	conducted	with	executives	
of	23	grant	making	trusts	and	foundations.	The	interviews	for	this	research	focused	on	
the	largest	grant	makers	in	terms	of	grant	expenditure,	however	included	foundations	
from	different	geographical	locations	and	from	across	different	cause	areas.
It	is	important	to	stress	at	the	outset	that	this	was	not	a	representative	sample	of	
foundations;	the	study	aimed	to	identify	issues	rather	than	to	present	a	representative	
picture	of	the	‘average’	foundation’s	response.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	the	study	
was	undertaken	in	September	2009	at	a	time	when	many	foundations	were	beginning	to	
feel	more	optimistic	about	the	longer	term	future,	but	aware	of	continuing	and	possibly	
worsening	short	term	income	problems.	But	whatever	the	financial	future,	some	of	the	
underlying	issues,	concerning	investment	and	grant	making	management	practices,	
raised	in	this	report	will	be	of	continuing	relevance	worthy	of	wider	discussion.	If	a	crisis	
is	too	good	to	waste,	it	is	also	too	good	to	forget.
One	other	introductory	point	–	as	previously	noted,	interviews	for	this	study	were	
conducted	in	September	2009	–	just	one	month	prior	to	the	introduction	of	the	new	
Private	Ancillary	Fund	(PAF)	legislation	which	replaced	the	previous	Prescribed	Private	
Fund	(PPF)	arrangement1.	References	to	PAFs	and/or	PPFs	reflect	that	time.
1	 Further	information	on	the	transition	from	PPFs	to	PAFs	is	available	from	the	Australian	
Taxation	Office’s	website:	www.ato.gov.au/nonprofit 
introDuCtion1
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2.1 the importanCe of founDations
The	precise	number	of	trusts	and	foundations	in	Australia	is	not	altogether	clear.	
Philanthropy	Australia	(n.d)	estimates	that	the	number	is	around	2,000	but	this	is	a	
conservative	estimate.	The	Trustee	Companies	manage	an	estimated	2,000	trusts	and	
foundations;	in	addition	to	800	registered	PAFs,	plus	all	of	the	corporate	and	independent	
and	family	foundations,	27	community	foundations	and	charitable	trusts	held	by	
independent	legal	firms	around	Australia.	This	suggests	that	there	may	be	at	least		
3,500	trusts	and	foundations	in	Australia.
The	total	value	of	these	trusts	and	foundations	grants	and	activities	is	also	difficult	to	
assess.	Philanthropy	Australia	(n.d),	based	on	an	estimated	2,000	trusts	and	foundations,	
puts	the	value	of	grants	and	operating	programmes	across	a	range	of	charitable	activities	
at	between	half	a	billion	and	one	billion	Australian	dollars.	But	some	(see	for	example	
de	Broms	2005),	would	argue	that	the	real	value	of	the	contribution	of	trusts	and	
foundations	lies	not	in	their	financial	wealth	per	se	but	rather	in	their	independence	to	
provide	risk	capital,	innovation,	research	and	development.	
Endowed	trusts	and	foundations	are	free	to	support	the	groups	and	causes	that	do	
not	command	popular	and	political	support.	Trusts	and	foundations	are	also	free	to	
back	ideas	and	activities	that	are	genuinely	innovative	and	thus	carry	a	high	risk	of	
failure.	Trusts	and	foundations	can	support	the	new	and,	by	conventional	standards,	the	
‘mad’	–	precisely	those	things	from	which	change	and	innovation	often	flow.	One	US	
commentator,	Paul	Ylvisaker	(1987)	described	foundations	as	society’s	‘passing	gear’.
At	a	time	when	government	and	business	increasingly	emphasising	the	importance	of	
tightly	specified	contracts	and	measurable	outcomes,	trusts	and	foundations,	some	
argue	(see	for	example	Anheier	and	Leat	2007),	have	never	been	more	important.	The	
health	of	trusts	and	foundations	is	therefore	a	matter	of	concern	not	only	to	the	non-profit	
sector	(for	which	they	provide	a	part	of	overall	funding),	but	to	wider	society.
2.2 founDations anD reCession
2.2.1 The Theory
Philanthropic	foundations,	and	those	who	depend	on	them,	have	good	reason	to	fear	
recession.	In	theory	at	least	an	economic	downturn	brings	with	it:
•	 increasing	demand	on	and	by	the	estimated	700,000	non-profits	in	Australia	(or	
around	600,000	excluding	credit	unions	and	bodies	corporate)	
•	 reduced	income	from	investments;	
•	 reduced	capacity	for	innovation;
•	 reduced	organisational	viability;
•	 reduced	job	security;	and	
•	 reduced	funding.	
In	addition	to	reduced	investment	income,	foundations	also	face	the	problem	of	
erosion	of	their	asset	base	leading	to	further	erosion	of	income,	further	pressures	on	
grantmaking,	and/or	liquidity	problems	leading	to	the	sale	of	distressed	assets.
Potentially,	there	are	further	ripples.	When	governments	tighten	their	belts	non-profit	
organisations	frequently	feel	the	pinch.	This	potentially	affects	foundations	in	a	variety	of	
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ways.	When	governments	reduce	funding	for	non-profits	foundations	may	be	expected	to	
fill	the	gap;	this	may	mean	being	asked	to	fund	new	things	or	it	may	mean	that	foundation	
grants	to	a	programme	jointly	funded	with	government	are	insufficient	or	ineffective.	
Giving	by	individuals	may	be	reduced,	and	fewer,	or	smaller,	new	foundations	created.	
Corporate	giving	may	also	be	reduced	by	the	loss	or	downsizing	of	companies,	take	
overs	and	mergers;	and	for	those	that	survive	and	remain	intact,	laying	off	workers	and	
cutting	dividends	and	then	giving	grants	may	be	difficult	to	square	in	the	public	mind.	
So,	in	theory,	economic	conditions	affect	foundations	directly	in	their	pockets	and	
indirectly	via	an	increase	in	demand	as	a	result	of	greater	social	need,	and	fewer	other	
sources	of	funding.	Furthermore,	foundations’	existing,	and	future,	patterns	of	giving	may	
be	jeopardised	if	key	partners	in	funding	do	not	step	up	to	the	table	–	leaving	foundations	
holding	the	baby	or	a	frail	baby	at	best.
That	is	the	theory,	but	past	evidence	suggests	a	different	picture.
2.2.2 PasT evidence
The	limited	data	from	previous	downturns	illustrates	the	disjunction	between	effects	
on	foundation	income	and	assets	and	patterns	of	giving.	US	Foundation	Center	data	
(Lawrence	2008)	suggest	that	in	the	recessions	of	the	1980’s	and	1990’s:
•	 US	foundation	giving	did	not	decline	(in	inflation	adjusted	dollars);
•	 US	foundation	giving	priorities	remained	relatively	stable;	and
•	 many	US	foundations	sought	to	be	counter	cyclical	i.e.	spending	to	offset	the	effects	
of	recession.
A	recent	article	in	The	Economist	(2009)	suggests	that	during	the	Great	Depression	
giving	in	the	US	rose	and	that	while	over	the	past	40	years	there	have	been	several	
recessions,	the	only	year	in	which	giving	fell	in	the	US	was	1987,	the	year	of	the	Black	
Monday	stock	market	crash.	The	article	then	goes	on	to	report	on	the	current	(i.e.	2009)	
reactions	of	the	heads	of	two	of	the	biggest	US	foundations	–	the	Carnegie	Corporation	
of	New	York	and	the	William	and	Flora	Hewlett	Foundation.
Both	foundations	(using	a	Yale	Model	of	investing	which	involves	taking	a	long	term	view	
of	financial	returns	and	heavy	reliance	on	private	equities)	had	kept	losses	to	less	than	
market	average	but	had	suffered	some	liquidity	problems.	Both	foundations’	assets	were	
much	smaller	than	the	previous	year	but	remained	much	bigger	than	they	were	a	few	
years	ago.	Each	foundation	expected	to	stick	to	giving	plans	for	2009	–	however	unless	
asset	prices	recovered	quickly	there	could	be	cuts	planned	for	2010.	Both	foundations	
had	however	started	to	cut	expenses	in	January	2009,	including	pay	freezes	and	halting	
of	construction	plans.	Despite	these	cut	backs,	neither	foundation	was	intending	to	
change	its	focus	of	giving	to	more	‘charity’	but	were	planning	on	sticking	to	a	‘risky	focus	
on	structural	solutions.’
In	England	and	Wales	both	the	Association	of	Charitable	Foundations	(ACF)	and	
the	Charity	Commission	have	undertaken	studies	of	the	effects	of	the	downturn	on	
foundations,	assets,	income	and	grantmaking.	The	ACF	study	was	a	wide scale	survey	of	
members,	while	the	Charity	Commission	(2009)	study	was	a	more	detailed	exploration	of	
effects	on	a	range	of	foundations.	Both	came	to	broadly	similar	conclusions.	
The	following	tables	summarise	a	few	of	the	key	points	from	the	Charity	Commission	
(2009)	study.
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Table 1: effecTs of The downTurn on asseTs (england and wales)
assets no change change not applicable*
No.	of	foundations 4 10 5
*	foundations	without	an	asset	base	e.g.	broadcast	appeal	grantmakers,	Big	Lottery	Fund	
Source:	Charity	Commission	2009:9
The	Charity	Commission	(2009)	study	found	that	of	the	10	foundations	that	reported	
change	in	the	value	of	assets:	2	had	suffered	a	change	of	over	30%;	4	a	change	of	
21–30%;	1	a	change	of	11–20%;	and	3	a	change	of	10%	or	below.
Table 2 : effecTs of The downTurn on income (england and wales)
% change number of trusts and foundations 
experiencing a decrease in income
number of trusts and foundations 
experiencing an increase in income
0–5% 8 0
6–10% 2 2
11–20% 1 2
21–30	% 1 0
Over	30% 3 0
Source:	Charity	Commission	2009:	9
Increases	in	income	were	mainly	due	to	an	increase	in	fundraised	income,	or	an	
increased	allocation	from	parent	companies	and	donors.
Table 3 :  effecTs of The downTurn on granTmaking exPendiTure in 2009 
(england and wales)
effects on grantmaking increase decrease no change/marginal change
Number	of	trusts	and	foundations 3 2 14
Source:	Charity	Commission	2009:9
2.2.3 The sTory beneaTh The headlines in The uk
Looking	at	the	figures	alone,	the	picture	is	a	mixed	one	of	foundations	that	have	seen	
reductions	in	asset	values	and	some	whose	assets	have	retained	their	value;	some	who	
have	seen	a	decrease	in	income	and	others	whose	income	has	increased.	The	data	on	
grantmaking	suggests	that	a	vast	majority	of	these	foundations	are	intending	to	keep	
grantmaking	steady,	while	others	expect	some	reduction	or	an	increase.	Underlying	this	
mixed	picture	is	a	more	complex	story	that	the	tables	above,	and	any	figures,	conceal.
The	real	effects	of	the	downturn	on	these	foundations’	assets,	income	and	future	
grantmaking	have	to	be	seen	in	the	context	of	six	key	factors	(Charity	Commission	2009):	
1.	 sources	of	income;	
2.	steady	boards	and	previous	planning;
3.	 	life	expectancy;	
4.	 investment	policies;	
5.	balancing	the	needs	of	current	and	future	beneficiaries;	and	
6.	other	commitments	
So,	it	seems	that	theory	and	reality	may	be	different.	But	aggregate	figures,	and	figures	
from	other	countries,	may	conceal	as	much	as	they	reveal.	First,	foundations	in	different	
countries	operate	under	different	legal	and	tax	regimes,	and	often	work	in	different	ways.	
Second,	not	all	foundations	are	the	same.	Third,	foundations	do	not	enter	a	downturn	in	
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a	vacuum	–	with	no	other	commitments,	no	other	demands,	no	other	events,	no	other	
pressures	or	facilitating	factors.	So	what	is	the	reality	–	what	are	the	issues	affecting	
the	way	in	which	foundations	in	Australia	are	experiencing	and	responding	to	the	global	
financial	crisis?	That	was	the	question	on	which	this	study	focused.
Before	discussing	the	findings	of	the	Australian	study	it	is	worth	sketching	the	context.
2.3  the Context: australia anD the 
global finanCial Crisis in 2009
It	is	interesting	that	in	Australia	the	term	‘global	financial	crisis’	is	more	widely	used	to	
refer	to	what	in	some	other	countries	is	called	‘recession’	or	‘downturn’.	In	Australia	one	
might	be	forgiven	for	asking	‘Crisis?	What	crisis?’
Australia	has	suffered	job	losses,	reductions	in	asset	values	and	dividend	cuts.	The	
interest	rate	was	cut	to	3%	in	July	2009.	GDP	is	expected	to	contract	by	0.5%	in	2009/10	
but	increase	by	2.25%	in	2010/11	(Kennedy	2009).	However,	Australia	is	better	off	than	
many.	As	Dr	Steven	Kennedy	of	the	Australian	Treasury	reported	on	24	June	2009:
	 	 ‘In	the	March	quarter	2009,	the	Australian	economy	grew	by	0.4	per	cent.	In	
contrast,	all	the	G7	economies	contracted	in	the	March	quarter	and	as	a	group	
by	2.1	per	cent.	Out	of	33	advanced	economies,	only	two	managed	to	grow	in	the	
March	quarter’	(Kennedy	2009)
In	addition,	the	Australian	dollar	has	increased	steadily	in	value	against	the	US	dollar	and	
the	Euro	in	recent	months.
Like	many	other	governments,	the	Australian	government	introduced	an	economic	
stimulus	package	totalling	$AUD52	billion.	$AUD500	million	was	made	available	to	the	
non-profit	sector,	churches	and	local	councils	(Kernot	2009).	For	the	foundation	sector	
there	has	been	the	additional	financial	benefit	of	the	effects	of	franking	credits	introduced	
by	then	Treasurer	Costello	in	the	late	1990’s.
So,	Australian	foundations	may	not	have	suffered	as	much	as	foundations	in	some	other	
countries.	But	there	have	been	other	demands	on	Australian	philanthropy	and	nonprofit	
organisations,	including	in	particular	the	Victorian	bushfires	and	Queensland	floods	of	2009.	
The	Victorian	bush	fires	of	February	2009	were	Australia’s	worst	natural	disaster	in	recorded	
history,	covering	400,000	hectares,	killing	around	180	people	and	millions	of	animals,	and	
destroying	more	than	2000	homes	(Australian	Red	Cross	2009).	Donations	to	bushfire	relief	
totalled	more	than	$370	million	in	cash	alone	(Australian	Red	Cross	2009),	however	this	
figure	did	not	include	the	enormous	amount	of	gifts	in-kind,	let	alone	the	volunteering	effort.
There	have	been	other	complicating	factors.	One	was	the	uncertainty	generated	from	
December	2008	to	September	2009	by	proposals	to	change	the	accumulation	and	
spending	requirements	of	PPF’s2.	
Another	complication,	seen	by	some	(see	for	example	Burke	2009)	as	significant,	is	that	
the	non-profit	sector	has	been	booming	in	recent	years	and,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	has	
adopted	increasingly	‘professional’	and	corporate	styles	and	practices.	‘This	increasing	
professionalism	has	benefited	many	organisations	but	it	left	others	with	costly	structures	
and	operations’	(Burke	2009:8).
2	 When	PAFs	became	effective	on	October	01	2009,	the	accumulation	plan	was	replaced	
by	a	5%	minimum	distribution	requirement.
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methoDology3
Broadly	the	research	aimed	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	Australian	trusts	and	
foundations	were	taking	an	actively	strategic	approach	to	their	investments	and	pursuit	
of	mission	(including	grant-making),	and	the	relationship	between	the	two	in	the	context	
of	the	economic	downturn.	Focus	was	given	to	identifying	the	issues	raised	as	a	
consequence	of	the	economic	downturn,	rather	than	providing	a	generalised	snapshot	of	
the	‘average’	foundations	response.	
To	fulfil	this	aim,	qualitative,	semi-structured	interviews	were	conducted	with	executives	
of	23	Australian	trusts	and	foundations.	This	method	was	chosen	as	it	provided	a	unique	
opportunity	to	delve	deeply	into	the	strategies	and	approaches	taken	by	individual	trusts	
and	foundations.	
3.1 sampling methoD
The	research	employed	a	non-random,	peer-to-peer	strategy	to	recruit	participants,	
with	Philanthropy	Australia	agreeing	to	assist	in	the	recruitment	of	Philanthropy	Australia	
members.	To	this	end,	Philanthropy	Australia	(on	behalf	of	the	research	team)	sent	a	
letter	of	introduction	and	invitation	to	participate	to	all	member	trusts	and	foundations.	
Individual	trusts	and	foundations	then	contacted	the	research	team	to	register	their	
interest	in	participating	in	the	study.	At	no	time	was	the	research	team	aware	of	which	
Australian	trusts	and	foundations	Philanthropy	Australia	had	approached	to	participate	in	
the	study.
Once	a	trust	or	foundation	registered	their	interest	in	the	study,	each	individual	
organisation	was	selected	for	inclusion	based	on	the	following:
•	 highest	grant	expenditure;
•	 cause	area;	and
•	 geographical	location.
3.2 responDent profile
Data	was	obtained	from	22	foundations	and	from	one	trustee	company	managing	a	large	
number	of	funds	and	thus	able	to	provide	some	overview.	The	foundations	were	not	a	
representative	sample.	Interviews	were	conducted	face	to	face	where	possible,	with	a	
small	number	of	telephone	interviews.
Tables	4	and	5	provide	a	snapshot	of	the	foundations	interviewed.
Table 4: foundaTions inTerviewed by source of income
source of income no. of foundations
Fully	endowed 10
Fundraising	and	Corpus	Building	* 8
Corporate	** 4
Not	classified 1
TOTAL 23
*	Fundraising	includes	encouraging	donors/donations,	receiving	grants	from	other	organisations	as	well	as	those	
still	building	a	corpus.
**	Those	dependent	on	company/employee/industry	donations	(may	or	may	not	also	have	some	corpus)
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Table 5 : range of asseTs 
range of assets number of foundations
$10	million	and	under 3
$11–50	million 4
$51–100	million 4
Over	$100	million 2
Not	applicable 2
Not	disclosed 7
Not	classified	(trustee	company	managing	multiple	funds) 1
TOTAL 23
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finDings4
4.1 effecTs of The downTurn – headlines
The	majority	(57%)	of	foundations	had	suffered	some	decrease	in	asset	values,	as	shown	
in	Table	6.	However,	in	the	majority	of	these	cases	these	values	were	beginning	to	rise	
again	in	September	2009.	Differences	in	reductions	in	values	appeared	to	be	related	
to	investment	portfolios	including,	in	particular,	the	proportion	of	liquid	assets.	The	one	
foundation	whose	asset	value	had	increased	was	a	new	PPF	that	had	bought	when	the	
market	was	very	low	and	was	now	seeing	the	gains.
Table 6 : effecTs on asseTs 
change  no. of foundations
No/marginal	change 2
Decrease:	
3–20%
From	20–40%
Over	40%
4
8
1
Increase	10–15% 1	
Not	applicable	(no	asset	base) 2
Not	disclosed 4
Not	classified 1
TOTAL 23
Table	7,	shows	that	some	investments	have	lost	asset	value	but	dividends	have	been	
maintained.	In	the	majority	(69%)	of	cases	there	has	been	marginal	or	no	change	in	levels	
of	income.	In	some	cases	decreases	in	income	were	not	directly	related	to	the	downturn.	
For	example,	one	foundation’s	income	was	decreased	because	of	an	unusual,	large,	
donation	in	the	previous	year.	In	some	other	cases	income	had	decreased	due	to	loss	
of	investment	income	but	this	had	been	largely	off-set	by	new	donations,	creating	only	a	
marginal	overall	change.
Table 7: effecTs on income
change no. of foundations
No/marginal	change 16
Increase 1	(30%)
Decrease:	
	under	10%
	10–20%
	Over	20%
0
3
2
Not	classified 1
Not	disclosed	 0
Not	applicable 0
The	majority	of	foundations	(69%)	had	made	no	changes	to	grantmaking	expenditure	in	
the	2008–09	period	(see	Table	8	below).	Again	where	grantmaking	had	decreased	(or	
increased)	this	was	not	necessarily	related	to	the	downturn	(as	discussed	below).
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Table 8 : effecTs on granTmaking exPendiTure in 2008–9
effect no. of foundations
No	change 	15
Increase 	2
Decrease:	
	under	20%
	20–30%
	over	40%
	
	1
	2
	1
Not	disclosed 	1
Not	classified 	1
4.2  the story beneath the heaDlines in 
australia 
4.2.1 The sTory in ouTline
In	general,	foundations’	capital	had	lost	value	in	line	with	the	decrease	in	value	of	the	
Australian	equities	market	(where	the	majority	of	foundations	had	the	majority	of	their	
investments).	Dividend	income	had	generally	held	up	well	in	the	last	year.	Foundations	
dependent	on	company	giving	interviewed	for	this	study	had	generally	not	seen	any	
decrease	in	income	from	giving	although,	like	others,	they	had	suffered	decreases	in	
capital	values	and	some	loss	of	investment	income	on	any	accumulated	corpus.	Some	of	
the	newer	PPF’s	had	actually	gained	from	the	downturn,	entering	the	market	with	cash	to	
purchase	‘bargains’.	
Community	foundations	were,	in	some	respects,	potentially	in	the	most	difficult	position	
insofar	as	their	income	for	administration	was	based	on	capital	values,	and	so	if	no	new	
donations	had	been	made	they	had	lost	around	a	quarter	to	a	third	of	their	operating	
income.	In	addition,	although	the	number	of	donors	topping	up	their	capital	funds	had	
remained	fairly	steady,	they	were	tending	to	top	up	in	smaller	amounts.	Community	
foundations	were,	however,	able	to	maintain	grantmaking	by	a	mix	of	income	and	capital,	
or	capital	accumulation,	from	those	funds	allowing	capital	distribution.	But	this	would	not	
continue	indefinitely.
4.2.2 inTerPreTing figures on granTmaking
Beneath	these	headline	figures	lies	a	more	complex	story	in	which	the	effects	of	the	
downturn	are	only	one	factor	–	and	sometimes	not	the	major	factor.	For	example,	one	
foundation	has	seen	roughly	a	30%	rise	in	its	income	this	year	–	but	this	30%	rise	is	the	
result	of	additional	donations	and	partnerships	unrelated	to	the	downturn.	In	two	cases	
grantmaking	expenditure	appears	to	have	risen	in	the	last	year	but	in	one	case	this	
reflected	the	stage	that	certain	multi-year	programmes	had	reached	and	in	another	was	
due	to	a	prior	decision	to	spend	some	capital	gain.	Conversely,	some	foundations	reporting	
a	decrease	in	grantmaking	compared	with	the	previous	year	noted	that	this	was	because	in	
the	previous	year	grantmaking	had	been	exceptionally	high,	for	various	reasons.
Increases	in	income	and	grantmaking	need	to	be	interpreted	with	caution;	similarly,	any	
decreases	in	the	coming	years	will	also	have	to	be	understood	in	a	broader	and	longer	
context,	and	in	relation	to	previous	year	increases.	
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For	example,	the	foundation	whose	income	has	risen	30%	in	the	past	year	will,	for	a	variety	
of	reasons,	including	the	end	of	certain	commitments,	be	likely	to	suffer	an	apparent	
decrease	in	income	in	the	coming	year.	In	fact,	of	course,	this	‘decrease’	may	simply	
take	it	back	to	its	position	before	the	spike	in	income.	Similarly,	those	foundations	whose	
grantmaking	has	increased	or	decreased	in	the	last	year	due	to	the	timing	of	programme	
commitments	may	show	declining	or	increasing	grantmaking	in	the	following	years.	But	
this	will	be	in	part	an	increase/decrease	in	relation	to	this	year’s	drop/spike.	By	contrast,	
one	foundation	had	deliberately	held	back	some	money	from	the	previous	year	in	order	to	
add	across	the	next	two	years	‘to	keep	a	steady	spend’.	As	always,	simple	year	on	year	
statistics	on	income	and	grantmaking	may	conceal	as	much	as	they	reveal.
Interpreting	trends	in	grantmaking	will	also	require	distinguishing	between	‘steady	state’	
grantmaking	totals	and	loss	of	growth.	For	example,	two	organisations	that	would	
normally	expect	to	increase	the	amount	they	have	to	spend,	and	invest,	year	on	year	
from	new	donors	and	donations,	reported	a	decline	in	new	business	either	in	numbers	of	
donors	or	size	of	donations,	or	both.	Another	foundation	that	works	with	partners	in	the	
private	sector	had	had	two	substantial	planned	projects	cancelled	at	a	very	late	stage.	
Thus	some	losses	will	never	appear	in	the	figures.
4.2.3 a Time of Turbulence
The	other	caveat	in	looking	at	figures	on	the	effects	of	the	downturn	on	Australian	
foundations	is	that	much	will	depend	on	when	you	ask	the	question.	In	September	2009	
foundations	were	beginning	to	feel	more	optimistic	though	they	were	aware	that	there	
could	be	choppy	waters	ahead.	
Some	foundations	suggested	that	‘we’ve	come	out	of	this	fairly	well,	but	a	lot	of	it	was	
more	luck	than	design’.	A	minority	of	others	had	taken	early	action,	predicting	that	the	
‘good	time	can’t	go	on’,	and	made	the	decision	to	move	some	funds	out	of	equities	into	
cash	–	‘that	turned	out	to	stand	us	well’.
Considerable	time	had	been	and	was	continuing	to	be	spent	by	some	Boards	on	
investment	strategies,	communicating	with	and	oversight	of	investment	managers.	More	
recently,	foundations	that	were	cash	rich	had	spent	time	assessing	the	right	moment	to	
re-enter	the	market.
Opinions	about	the	future	varied.	One	company	managing	the	investments	of	a	very	
large	number	of	foundations	is	forecasting	a	‘worst	case	scenario’	of	a	drop	in	income	of	
25%	in	2010	–	although	the	expectation	is	that	things	will	not	be	this	bad.	Where	grants	
are	made	quarterly	and	there	are	significant	multi-year	grants	and	partnerships,	the	
foundations	were	working	with	that	worst	case	scenario	figure.
Another	foundation	said:	‘We’re	neither	optimistic	nor	pessimistic	we’re	just	sort	of	going	
slow	on	grantmaking.	We	think	we	can	do	a	bit	more	but	we’re	taking	it	slowly’.
In	general	the	approach	was:	
	 ‘Wait	and	see’
	 ‘It’ll	fix	up	soon’;	and
	 ‘The	Trustees	are	all	over	60	so	they	have	seen	it	all	before’.
14
seCtion 4
4.3 faCtors anD issues
The	effects	of	an	economic	downturn	on	the	work	of	Australian	foundations	is	shaped	by	
a	number	of	factors	including:	
•	 age,	stage	and	liquidity;
•	 investment	policies;
•	 distribution	requirements	and	the	definition	of	income;
•	 the	demand	for	grants;
•	 previous	grantmaking	policy	and	practice;	and	
•	 the	future	
4.3.1 age, sTage and liquidiTy
Those	PPF’s	that	were	still	developing	their	investment	policies	and	had	high	levels	of	
liquidity	were	able	to	buy	at	(what	they	hoped	was)	the	bottom	of	the	market.	As	one	PPF	
said:
	 	 ‘The	GFC	provided	us	with	an	opportunity’	but	added	‘while	the	PPF	legislation	
saga	just	led	to	confusion	and	higher	legal	bills’.	
Another	suggested	that	the	latter	had	been	far	more	disruptive	than	the	former.
Newer	PPF’s	also	benefited	from	the	fact	that	they	did	not	yet	tend	to	have	large	long	
term	grant	commitments,	giving	them	greater	flexibility	in	allocating	income.	This	flexibility	
was	further	enhanced	where	the	PPF	had	not	spent	income	for	6	months	or	more	while	it	
was	getting	systems	and	plans	in	place.
But	it	was	not	only	new	PPF’s	that	benefited	from	additional	liquidity.	Some	foundations,	
by	chance	or	design,	had	more	money	in	cash	than	they	would	normally	hold.	While	this	
had	generally	served	the	foundation	well,	one	person	commented	that:	
	 	 ‘There	was	a	stage	when	the	Board	got	very	twitchy	about	the	amount	of	money	
in	banks	and	I	had	to	keep	moving	the	money	around	to	get	the	government	
guarantees’.
One	approach	to	liquidity	was:	
	 	 ‘We	have	no	percentages	for	levels	of	liquidity.	It’s	more	a	constant	conversation	
about	maximising	income	and	cash	flow	projections	for	the	year.	At	present	we’ve	
got	a	couple	of	million	liquid	but	we’re	just	looking	at	putting	one	million	of	that	
away’.
Another	approach	was	to	set	percentages	of	funds	in	cash	and	fixed	interest	accounts,	
sometimes	as	high	as	50%.	This	approach	had	served	foundations	well	in	the	last	year.	
	 	 ‘It’s	our	policy	to	invest	50–50	in	equities	and	cash	and	fixed	interest.	In	recent	
years	some	might	have	been	tempted	to	increase	the	level	of	equities	because	
they	outperform	in	the	long	run	and	for	a	perpetual	foundation	that’s	ok.	And	when	
equities	were	giving	eye	watering	gains	it	seemed	great.	But	it’s	a	risky	strategy	–	
as	we’ve	seen’.
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4.3.2 invesTmenT Policies
ausTralian equiTies
Opinions	were	divided	on	whether	high	levels	of	investment	in	Australian	equities	had	left	
foundations	better	or	worse	than	those	with	more	diversified	portfolios.	But	this	approach	
was	a	matter	of	increasing	debate.	
For	some	foundations	one	of	the	key	investment	policy	dilemmas	was	the	percentage	
of	Australian	equities	to	hold	within	the	investment	portfolio.	One	issue	here	was	the	
franking	tax	advantages	of	investing	in	Australian	equities	not	available	for	international	
equities;	another	was	an	argument	related	to	definition	of	income	under	trust	law:	
	 	 ‘Our	investment	policy	is	about	identifying	pure	income	under	trust	law	–	that	
means	rents,	dividends	and	interest.	No	other	asset	class	(i.e.	other	than	
Australian	equities)	delivers	the	same	income	by	that	definition’.
Others	argued	that	the	advantage	of	Australian	equities	lay	in	knowledge	and	comfort.	
	 	 ‘We	have	no	international	shares	and	no	international	grantmaking.	We	are	
invested	99%	in	Australian	equities.	That’s	not	because	it’s	patriotic	and	we	did	
consider	going	wider	a	few	years	ago	and	then	rejected	it.	The	emphasis	on	
Australian	investments	is	more	about	comfort	and	knowledge	–	our	Board	are	so	
well	connected	they	know	the	Australian	market’.	
Another	foundation	had,	during	2007/8,	instructed	its	investment	managers	to	reduce	
exposure	to	international	and	property	investment	markets	and	to	increase	investments	in	
ASX	Top	100	stocks.
Another	issue	is	the	debate	between	those	who	argue	that	a	maximum	holding	of	
Australian	equities	gives	maximum	franking	credits	and	those	who	believe	that	skewing	
an	entire	portfolio	for	tax	reasons	is	not	a	sound	investment	strategy.	This	debate	has	
been	given	an	added	twist	by	the	desire	of	some	foundations	to	diversify	their	portfolios	
in	order	to	hedge	against	the	future	risk	of	over-exposure	to	Australian	equities.	One	
foundation	commented:	
	 	 ‘We’ve	worked	hard	to	maximise	our	franking	credits	so	we’re	very	overweight	on	
Australian	equities	–	it’s	not	a	balanced	fund	and	some	people	are	saying	that	has	
been	or	will	be	a	loss	to	philanthropy’.	
Another	foundation,	with	a	diversified	portfolio,	said:	
	 	 ‘The	trend	is	to	global	companies.	To	restrict	yourself	to	Australian	equities	would	
create	an	artificial	filter,	as	well	as	ruling	out	some	industries	completely.’	
Another	said:	
	 	 ‘For	us	it’s	about	prudent	person	law	and	a	heavy	reliance	on	Australian	equities	
doesn’t’t	look	that	prudent	to	us’.
changes To Policy
Some	foundations	had	reviewed	their	investment	strategies	in	the	last	few	years	(prior	
to	the	downturn)	and	had	made	usually	minor	changes	to	percentages	across	asset	
allocation	classes	to	ensure	a	‘balanced	portfolio’.	Others	were	not	planning	any	
changes.	As	one	said:	
	 	 ‘It’s	worked	for	over	100	years	and	if	you’re	investing	for	100	years	plus	then	
you	don’t	change	just	because	of	this’.	
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Another	commented:	
	 	 ‘We’ve	done	some	work	on	risk	in	trust	investment	income	and	considered	
greater	diversification	–	but	our	people	say	the	only	real	risk	is	inflation	risk’.
Two	foundations	had	however	changed	investment	managers	and	portfolios;	in	both	
cases	this	was	the	result	of	long	standing	dissatisfaction	but	was	‘given	a	push’	by	the	
economic	situation.
caPiTal disTribuTion and ToTal reTurns
Some	foundations	can	distribute	capital	if	they	wish;	others	are	prohibited	from	so	doing	
by	the	trust	deed;	yet	others	prescribe	some	accumulation	of	income	to	capital	but,	in	
practice,	the	amount	varies	in	relation	to	both	the	market	and	the	stage	the	foundation’s	
programmes	have	reached.	For	example,	one	foundation	prescribing	some	accumulation	
of	income	to	capital	had	in	fact	accumulated	a	very	large	proportion	of	income	to	capital	
in	recent	years	because	it	is	embarking	on	a	new	and	‘challenging’	programme	of	giving	
with	few	grants	as	yet.	These	differences	in	approaches	to	capital	accumulation	‘create	
different	investment	conversations’	–	but	may	create	fewer	differences	in	grantmaking	
practice	in	that	a	foundation	that	has	the	option	to	spend	capital	gain	may	rarely,	if	ever,	
actually	do	so.
Underlying	a	reluctance	to	spend	capital	gain	(when	allowed)	was	a	particular	view	of	the	
raison	d’etre	of	foundations:	
‘The	primary	responsibility	is	to	generate	income	to	distribute’.	
Therefore:	
	 	 ‘In	our	view	it’s	very	important	to	separate	income	from	capital.	If	a	foundation	
is	invested	for	perpetuity	the	capital	will	never	be	realised	so	the	asset	is	just	a	
tool	to	generate	income.’
invesTmenT managemenT
	 	 ‘We	have	a	very	hands-on	Board	which	also	sits	as	an	Investment	Committee.	
They	manage	two	fund	managers	and	quiz	them	very,	very	carefully.	The	
Board	are	very	savvy	and	they	enjoy	that	aspect	of	the	work	–	they	have	strong	
business	backgrounds.’	
Foundations	who	managed	their	own	investments	believed	that	they	had	done	no	worse	
than	those	employing	advisors,	especially	if	fees	were	taken	into	account.	However,	some	
questioned	the	wisdom	of	a	DIY	approach	and	the	implications	for	conflict	of	interest	and	
due	diligence.	‘Who	is	the	Board	accountable	to?	Itself?’	one	foundation	asked.
4.3.3 disTribuTion requiremenTs and definiTion of income
Some	foundations	emphasised	that	they	are	expected	to	distribute	all	of	their	income	
every	year	or	all	apart	from	an	amount	to	account	for	inflationary	effects	on	the	corpus.	
	 	 ‘If	you’re	distributing	less	than	85%	then	you’d	better	have	a	very,	very	good	
reason	for	that’.	
This	may	be	modified	by	the	specific	requirements	of	trust	deeds,	trustee	legislation	or	
specific	statutory	provisions	such	as	the	new	PAF	regime.	In	addition,	it	is	possible	that	
some	staff	and	trustees	are	unclear	about	exactly	what	is	and	is	not	permitted.	
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Furthermore,	under	trust	law	income	is	often	narrowly	defined	as	income	from	rents,	
dividends	and	interest.	Unlike	foundations	in	England	and	Wales,	Australian	foundations	
do	not	typically	feel	free	to	operate	a	total	return	policy	in	which	the	return	is	calculated	
as	rents,	dividends,	interest	etc	and	capital	gains	or	losses	(note	that	this	is	different	from	
‘spending	down’	because	the	real	value	of	the	corpus	is	maintained	in	perpetuity		
if	required).
4.3.4 demand for granTs
With	three	exceptions,	foundations	did	not	report	noticeable	increases	in	demand	for	
grants.	One	foundation	that	had	seen	a	large	increase	in	applications	attributed	this	to	
changes	in	the	structure	of	federal	government	funding	rather	than	to	the	downturn	per	
se.	Another	foundation	that	also	detected	a	rise	in	applications	for	one	of	its	programmes	
said:	
	 	 ‘It’s	hard	to	know.	It	could	be	economic	conditions	or	it	could	be	the	fact	that	we	
are	getting	better	known	and	so	more	people	are	coming	to	us.’	
Interestingly,	one	foundation	said:	
	 	 ‘In	the	next	year	or	so	we	may	not	work	as	hard	as	we	have	done	to	promote	our	
grants	programmes	–	it’s	going	to	be	all	about	managing	expectations’.
One	foundation	that	had	seen	a	slight	increase	in	applications	attributed	this	to:	
	 	 ‘charities	getting	worried	so	they’re	sending	out	six	applications	instead	of	three	–	
so	you	can’t	assume	it’s	necessarily	about	changes	in	levels	of	need’.
Stable	or	decreasing	application	levels	were	also	not	interpreted	as	necessarily	indicating	
real	levels	of	need.	For	example,	one	foundation	with	stable	levels	of	applications	
suggested	that	this	might	be	because	the	sorts	of	things	they	fund	are	not	people’s	most	
immediate	needs	at	present.	Another	foundation	that	had	seen	a	decrease	in	applications	
for	its	change	oriented	programmes	suggested	that	this	was	because	‘people	are	
hunkering	down,	just	getting	on	with	the	work’.
4.3.5 Previous granTmaking Policy and PracTice
sTyles of granTmaking
Style	of	grantmaking	–	particularly	the	typical	duration	of	a	grant	–	was	a	key	factor	in	
managing	in	the	current	conditions.
Foundations	varied	in	their	general	approaches	to	giving.	Some	gave	large	proportions	
of	one-off	or	relatively	short	term	grants;	others	engaged	in	a	large	proportion	of	longer	
term	grants.	In	the	latter	case,	a	foundation	might	begin	the	year	with	the	majority	of	its	
income	already,	in	effect,	committed.	Again	the	age	and	stage	of	the	foundation	was	a	
factor.	New	foundations	did	not	typically	have	many	long	term	commitments.
A	number	of	foundations	had	made	changes	to	grantmaking	policies	and	approaches	in	
recent	years	partly	as	a	result	of	a	more	critical	approach	to	what	they	were	achieving	
and	the	desire	to	evaluate	their	grantmaking.	This	had	tended	to	encourage	a	smaller	
number	of	larger	and	longer	term	grants.	For	some	this	process	was	complete,	for	others	
it	was	in	train:
	 	 ‘it	would	have	happened	anyway	but	the	downturn	has	focused	that	process’.
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changes To granTmaking?
Foundations	in	the	habit	of	giving	multi-year	grants	did	not	in	general	intend	to	renege	on	
those	commitments.	
	 	 ‘We	work	with	a	10	year	horizon	making	grants	that	will	come	to	maturity	in	5–10	
years	time’;	and
	 	 ‘It’s	our	job	to	manage	that	bit.	We	don’t	make	commitments	we	can’t	keep’.
In	at	least	one	case	this	was	going	to	mean	spending	some	accumulated	capital	which	
the	foundation	had	the	freedom	to	do	but	had	not	conventionally	done:	
	 	 ‘	XXX	has	made	some	significant	accumulation	in	recent	years	so	spending	now	
will	just	even	things	out	a	bit’.
The	practice	of	allocating	all	of	the	funds	committed	to	a	multi-year	grant	in	the	year	
in	which	the	decision	is	made	(and	keeping	unpaid	future	instalments	in	a	designated	
interest	earning	account)	seemed	to	be	relatively	unusual.	The	minority	of	foundations	
adopting	this	strategy	suggested	that	it	had	various	significant	advantages:	
	 	 ‘You	can	sleep	at	night	because	you	know	the	money	is	there	whatever	happens,	and
	 	 ‘You	can	manage	that	cash	flow	to	obtain	maximum	returns	without	delaying	
grants	payments’.
For	some	foundations	multi-year	grants	in	the	current	economic	context	highlighted	
issues	about	knowing	when	to	exit	after	a	long	and	expensive	commitment.	
	 	 ‘It’s	an	issue	for	us	and	for	government.	You	say	it’s	a	five	year	programme	but	
what	stage	are	they	at	in	5	years,	and	can	they	carry	on?’
Some	foundations	commented	that	making	longer	term	grants	in	the	current	economic	
climate	is:	
	 	 ‘Much	harder.	We	wouldn’t	want	to	make	future	commitments	that	would	prevent	
us	being	responsive’;	and	
	 	 ‘We	don’t	want	to	commit	60%	of	next	year’s	income	because	that	might	be	all	
we’ve	got’.	
Others	are	thinking	about	–	or	already	–	slightly	scaling	back	the	size	of	larger	grants.	
	 	 ‘In	recent	years	a	$100,000	grant	for	4	years	would	probably	have	been	ok	–	now	
that’s	probably	too	big.’	
Another	suggested	that	
	 	 ‘There’s	still	a	big	emphasis	on	leverage	–	maybe	suggesting	to	organisations	that	
they	should	ask	more	from	government	or	other	partners’.	
But	another	foundation	was	worried	about	partners	not	being	able	to	gain	or	meet	
commitments	from	other	funders,	thus	jeopardising	the	effectiveness	of	the	foundation’s	
grant.
Where	long	term	grants	were	not	‘fully	committed’	some	foundations	had,	with	notice,	
‘taken	back’/not	continued	with	a	part	of	the	understanding.
Some	foundations	working	in	partnerships	with	or	fundraising	from	others	complained	
of	the	tendency	to	rein,	say,	three	year	funding	commitments	back	to	an	initial	one	or	
two	years.	The	issue	here	was	not	only	the	fear	of	reduced	contributions	but	also,	at	this	
stage,	the	effects	on	planning	and	workload.
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smaller granTs? more ‘PracTical’ granTs?
Several	foundations	had	had	some	discussion	of	the	need	for	increased	smaller	grants	
across	the	board	–	but	this	was	nothing	new	–	‘there’s	always	that	big-small	tension’.
There	was	also	a	feeling	in	some	foundations	that	projects	with	demonstrated	direct	
links	to	beneficiaries	are	‘getting	a	better	ear.	It’s	like	a	different	aura’.	Other	foundations	
emphasised	the	importance	of	retaining	a	small	grants	programme	to	‘support	small	
organisations	in	small	communities’.
less ‘discreTion’, less creaTiviTy?
Having	a	discretionary	pot	of	money	is	often	regarded	by	foundations	as	a	key	
tool	in	their	capacity	to	be	responsive	and	to	take	risks.	Where	a	foundation	had	a	
‘discretionary’	pot	of	money	or	grants	programme	–	in	some	cases	built	from	capital	
gains	–	this	was	likely	to	have	been	closed.	In	part	this	was	related	to	the	downturn	and	
the	feeling	that	it	was	necessary	to	focus	on	core	business	and	commitments,	but	there	
were	other	factors.	For	example,	one	foundation	had	used	its	discretionary	budget	to	
make	allocations	to	the	bush	fires	in	Victoria.	Some	foundation	staff	saw	no	likely	effects	
on	risk	and	innovation	because	they	saw	their	Board	as	already	very	risk	averse	–	and	
unlikely	to	change	in	the	current	climate.	Others	believed:	
	 	 ‘The	danger	is	less	strong	applications	because	grantees	are	responding	to	what	
they	think	we	will	do.	The	danger	is	that	we	get	a	load	of	‘lite’	projects.	But	it’s	a	
careful	balance	between	realism	and	going	over	the	top.’
sources of income
Within	this	non-random	group	of	foundations,	source	of	income	seemed	to	make	little	
difference	to	the	impact	of	the	downturn.	Clearly,	some	corporate	giving	programmes	
have	been	hit,	but	so	too	have	endowed	private	foundations.	Two	of	the	corporate	giving	
programs	included	in	this	study	were	in	some	respects	in	a	better	position	than	the	
endowed	foundations	insofar	as	their	annual	allocation	was	at	a	fixed	rate	(i.e.	rather	than	
a	percentage	of	profits).
In	many	ways,	those	in	the	most	difficult	position	were	the	community	foundations	
whose	overhead	fees	were	calculated	as	a	percentage	of	asset	value;	this	had,	of	
course,	declined	while	the	amount	of	work	and	added	value	created	by	the	foundation	
remained	the	same.	These	foundations	were	in	a	similar	position	to	the	broadcast	
appeal	foundations	in	the	UK	who	were	having	difficulty	in	covering	their	running	costs	
from	interest	payments	(despite	an	increase	in	donations)	and	maintaining	their	promise	
that	‘every	penny	raised	is	spent	on	people	in	need’.	One	community	foundation	had	
responded	by	increasing	its	fee	–	and	had	found	little	resistance	to	this.
4.4 the future
The	future	is,	of	course,	a	moving	target.	As	one	foundation	remarked:	
	 	 ‘the	talk	has	changed	a	lot	since	last	year	–	it’s	much	more	relaxed	now’.
4.4.1 The lag
Most	foundations	were	keen	to	point	out	that	while	their	asset	value	had	dropped	it	was	
still	ahead	of	what	it	was	even	just	a	few	years	ago,	and	dividends	had	held	up	well.	
However,	many	were	apprehensive	about	this	continuing	because	grantmaking	budgets	
tend	to	be	based	on	money	earned	(dividends)	the	previous	year	which	in	turn	in	based	
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on	companies’	earnings	and	growth	in	the	year	before	that.	2009–2011	may	be	the	
years	in	which	dividends	are	hardest	hit,	and	the	effect	on	grantmaking	budgets	will	be	
amplified	by	corresponding	decreases	in	franking	credits.
Bonyhady	(2008)	has	identified	three	factors	critical	to	the	foundation	sector.	First,	
Treasury	is	likely	to	be	looking	for	further	revenue	sources	–	philanthropy	and	tax	
concessions	to	the	sector	could	receive	new	focus.	Second,	Treasury	is	forecasting	a	
sharp	spring	back	in	growth	in	2011/12	but	most	forecasters	are	more	pessimistic.	Third,	
Australia’s	large	current	account	deficit	needs	to	be	financed	off	shore	and	that	will	make	
Australia	vulnerable	and	dependent	on	how	the	current	global	banking	crisis	is	resolved;	
if	US	and	European	banks	give	priority	to	lending	at	home	Australia	will	be	drawn	deeper	
into	the	global	recession	by	this	protectionism.
Foundations	were	generally	conscious	of	these	factors,	and	the	most	pessimistic	had	
other	worries	related	to	the	growing	strength	of	the	Australian	dollar	and	its	effects	on	
exports.	One	foundation	receiving	grants	and	working	internationally	received	more	than	
half	of	its	income	in	foreign	currencies	so	the	strength	of	the	Australian	dollar	in	recent	
months	had	been	a	growing	problem.	
The	optimists	were	confident	that	‘it’ll	fix	up	soon’	and	some	pointed	to	the	additional	
money	which	might	come	into	grantmaking	as	a	result	of	the	new	spending	requirements	
for	PPF’s.
4.5 the silver lining?
All	of	the	foundations	interviewed	saw	some	benefits	arising	from	the	economic	
uncertainties	of	the	last	year.
4.5.1 The big wake uP call?
One	theme	was	that	of	greater	thinking	around	investments	and	capital	growth:	
	 	 ‘The	downturn	on	top	of	massive,	massive	growth	has	really	shaken	the	sector	out	
of	a	sense	of	complacency	about	the	ease	of	accumulation’.
	 	 ‘People	just	forget	that	money	doesn’t	keep	on	growing’.
	 	 ‘Some	trustees	of	foundations	have	been	playing	fast	and	loose	with	money.	They	
need	to	be	aware	of	accountability	and	take	a	reality	check’.
	 	 ‘It’s	shown	people	that	money	isn’t	easy	to	make,	that	you	need	to	understand	
what	you	are	investing	in’.
	 	 ‘Maybe	it’s	brought	some	old	values	–	like	trust	and	experience	–	back	into	focus’.
	 	 ‘Why	ever	did	you	think	that	the	last	20	years	was	normal?’
	 	 ‘It’s	waking	people	up.	Making	them	ask	what	is	financial	sufficiency	and	how	do	
I	plan	for	that,	and	making	them	think	about	how	important	charities	are	in	our	
world’.
	 	 ‘It’s	about	getting	back	to	basics.	Some	foundations	got	into	investments	they	
didn’t	understand’.
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4.5.2 more Thinking and focus 
Greater	reflectiveness	and	focus	was	a	recurring	theme.	This	had	various	aspects.	One	
aspect	was	greater	focus	on	where	and	how	foundations	may	best	add	value:
	 	 ‘One	of	the	great	things	is	that	we’ve	revisited	everything	we	do,	looking	at	where	
we	can	really	make	the	greatest	contribution’.
	 	 ‘We’re	spending	time	released	by	the	moratorium	on	new	grants	to	review	our	
guidelines’.	
	 	 ‘There’s	more	thinking	about	what	our	priorities	really	are	–	what	would	we	keep	if	
the	chips	were	really	down?’.	
	 	 ‘We’re	much	more	conscious	of	the	opportunity	costs	of	every	grant	now	–	it’s	not	
is	this	good	but	is	this	the	best	use	of	our	dollars’.
	 	 ‘Realising	we	can’t	be	all	things	to	all	people,	so	what	can	we	be?’
	 	 ‘We’ve	always	had	lower	levels	of	application	from	some	disadvantaged	areas	–	
this	has	pushed	us	really	to	try	to	understand	and	deal	with	that’.
Adding	value	was	not	just	about	money.	Foundations	cited	the	example	of	one	foundation	
that	now	had	no	money	to	give	away	but	was	keeping	on	a	member	of	staff	to	work	
with	grantees	to	explore	ways	of	adding	value.	Another	community	foundation	that	had	
exhausted	its	current	flow	through	funds	for	the	year	was	engaging	in	some	creative	
capacity	building	programmes	for	smaller	community	organisations	using	its	knowledge	
and	networks.
Longer	term	grants	were	another	area	for	more	thinking:
	 	 ‘What	are	the	full	implications	of	longer	term	grants?	We’re	thinking	more	about	
decisions	and	foresight,	about	managing	the	money,	about	how	you	set	up	the	
relationship	with	grantees	to	manage	the	possibility	of	not	being	able	to	pay.	
There’s	also	an	issue	about	the	law	of	fettering	–	trustees’	capacity	to	commit	
future	trustees	to	future	decisions	–	that	debate	is	becoming	much	more	
focussed’;	and
	 	 ‘It’s	made	the	Board	more	thoughtful	about	when	to	exit	and	the	value	of	projects’.
4.5.3  greaTer awareness of issues and of The value of 
PhilanThroPy
There	was	a	widespread	view	that	the	downturn	had	made	people	more	aware	of	the	
importance	of	philanthropy	in	society,	even	if	they	were	not	currently	able	to	give	more:
	 	 ‘There’s	a	greater	sensitivity	to	people	who	are	worse	off’.	
The	corporate	contributions	to	in-house	foundations	had	generally	been	held	steady	or	
had	increased	slightly:	
	 	 ‘I	think	there’s	recognition	that	a	cut	would	have	been	dangerous	for	the	firm	and	
for	morale.	So,	in	some	ways	I	think	the	position	of	the	foundation	is	clearer	now’.
Several	foundations	noted	that	the	downturn	had:
	 	 ‘really	underlined	the	needs	we’ve	been	talking	about.	Things	that	are	seen	as	
more	important	now	have	always	been	central	to	our	work	–	that	sort	of	makes	us	
stronger’.
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4.5.4 addiTional resources
Three	foundations	felt	that	they	had	benefitted	from	the	downturn	in	the	form	of	additional	
resources.	One	had	recruited	several	volunteers:
	 	 ‘they’re	people	who	can’t	get	work	and	they’re	fabulous.	I	wouldn’t	have	got	them	
without	this	situation	and	they	are	a	complete	boon	for	me.’	
This	foundation	had	also	been	able	to	move	into	reduced	rent	premises	previously	
used	by	another	foundation	that	was	reducing	its	grantmaking.	Two	other	corporate	
foundations	had	also	benefited	from	additional	employee	volunteers,	increasing	the	firms’	
pro	bono	work,	because	‘people	have	got	more	time	than	before’.
4.5.5 more collaboraTion
More	collaboration	was	another	frequently	mentioned	benefit:
	 	 ‘If	you’ve	got	less	money	you	need	to	think	about	making	it	work	harder’.
	 	 ‘There’s	a	spirit	of	collaboration	between	trusts	from	the	sense	of	there	being	less	
money	about	as	well	as	new	personnel’.	
	 	 ‘It’s	become	a	very	friendly	environment.	Even	government	is	coming	to	the	table	
now’.
4.5.6 more creaTiviTy
One	foundation	suggested	that:
	 	 ‘Adversity	breeds	innovation.	We’re	being	more	creative	about	adding	value’.	
For	example	one	community	foundation	has	developed	some	new	investment	products	
which	give	donors	greater	choice	and	are	better	adapted	to	more	difficult	economic	
times.	Another	example	of	adversity-led	creativity	also	came	from	a	community	
foundation	that	was	using	its	non-financial	resources	to	support	and	develop	skills	in	
small	community	groups.
4.5.7 raTionalising The secTor: The Place of Passion?
Opinions	were	divided	on	the	potential	benefits	of	rationalisation	and	mergers	in	the	non-
profit	sector	and	among	foundations.	Some	saw	this	as	a	likely	positive	outcome	of	the	
downturn	creating	greater	efficiency	and	reducing	duplication	and	waste.	Others	argued	
that	there	were	dangers	in	‘sacrificing	the	heart	and	soul	of	the	sector’	and	of	‘losing	the	
passion	of	place	based	work’.
4.5.8 recogniTion of The need for oPeraTing cosTs 
Some	believed	that	the	current	situation	might	encourage	foundations	to	be	more	
aware	of	the	needs	of	nonprofit	organisations	for	funding	to	cover	operating	costs	and	
organisational	development.	
	 	 ‘It’s	improved	our	relationship	and	communications	with	some	of	our	community	
partners.	I	think	there’s	more	recognition	of	reality.	We’re	all	vulnerable’.
Two	other	foundations	also	suggested	that	the	economic	crisis	might	lead	to	greater	
acceptance	of	the	need	for	adequate	operating	costs	for	foundations.
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international observations5
Financial	crises	affect	foundations	in	different	ways.	Differences	in	depths	of	recession	in	
different	countries	are	one	factor	–	but	in	a	global	financial	investment	market	the	impact	
of	these	differences	on	foundations’	incomes	may	be	less	than	expected;	and	foreign	
exchange	fluctuations	can	play	havoc	with	investment	values,	income	and	grantmaking.
Perhaps	if	not	more	important	than	the	economic	conditions	within	a	country	are	
differences	in	the	regulatory	and	tax	environments	under	which	foundations	in	different	
countries	operate.	Grantmaking	styles	and	practices	are	another	factor.
Two,	among	other,	factors	may	be	significant	in	understanding	differences	in	how	UK	and	
Australian	foundations	are	coping	with	recession.	One	is	the	practice	of	adopting	a	total	
return	approach	to	spending.
5.1 a total return approaCh
In	a	recent	study	in	England	and	Wales	(Charity	Commission	2009),	of	the	top	20	
grantmaking	foundations	the	majority	of	endowed	foundations	interviewed	adopted	
a	total	return	approach	to	investment	management.	This	allows	trustees	to	manage	
investments	without	the	need	to	take	into	account	whether	the	return	is	income,	
dividends,	interest	etc	or	capital	gains	and	losses.	Normally	a	total	return	approach	
cannot	be	adopted	in	relation	to	permanent	endowment	funds	although	the	Charity	
Commission	can	enable	this	for	charities	in	England	and	Wales.	A	total	return	approach	
is	different	from	reducing	the	value	of	a	corpus	(or	spending	down)	–	total	return	works	
to	maintain	the	real	value	of	the	corpus	rather	than	allowing	it	to	increase	indefinitely	
and	involves	a	complicated	formula	to	take	into	account	inflation	and	short	term	market	
fluctuations.
Foundations	in	the	UK	adopting	a	total	return	approach	generally	found	this	very	helpful	
in	responding	to	the	downturn.	As	one	person	summed	it	up:	‘total	return	works	to	avoid	
overreaction	in	good	and	bad	times’.	But	it	is	also	important	to	note	here	that	a	total	
return	approach	based	on	12	quarter	trailing	averages	creates	a	lag	in	the	effects	of	
reductions	in	value	of	assets	and	income.
Among	these	foundations	in	the	UK,	the	downturn	after	a	period	of	significant	growth	
had	two	effects.	One	was	that	some	foundations	saw	their	asset	values	as	returning	to	
a	pre-growth	value	that	some	had	seen	as	over-inflated	and	unsustainable.	The	other	
effect	was	that	in	the	last	few	years,	as	a	result	of	significant	growth,	some	foundations	
had	decided	to	begin	to	spend	some	of	that	growth	which	was	then	added	to	the	
grantmaking	‘pot’	creating	an	increase	or	a	steady	state	in	grantmaking	despite	reduction	
in	investment	income.
Among	the	foundations	interviewed	in	Australia	a	total	return	approach	was	relatively	
rare;	some	were	interested,	others	considered	it	prohibited	by	law.	Three	of	the	
foundations	interviewed	said	that	they	adopted	a	version	of	a	total	return	approach,	
putting	some	part	of	capital	gain	into	a	reserve	fund	to	be	spent	as	and	when	needed.	
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5.2 linking the money anD the DeCision
The	second	factor	helping	foundations	in	England	and	Wales	through	recession	is	the	
practice	of	‘taking	out	of	play’	the	whole	of	a	long	term	grant	in	the	year	in	which	the	
decision	is	made	(and	most	usually	investing	that	money	in	an	interest	bearing	reserve	
fund).	This	practice	appears	to	be	less	common	in	Australia	and	had	led	to	some	
difficulties	for	some	foundations	whose	income	for	the	coming	years	was	largely	already	
committed.
One	of	the	side-effects	of	this	period	of	economic	uncertainty	may	be	some	
reassessment	of	grantmaking	practices	adopted	in,	and	adapted	to,	the	boom	years	
when	more	and	more	income	each	year	came	to	be	accepted	as	the	norm.	Longer	term	
grants	may	require	different	financial	management	arrangements	from	short	term	grants.	
Another	related	issue	that	may	need	to	be	revisited	is	when	to	exit.	When	funding	is	
relatively	plentiful,	deciding	in	advance	when	to	exit	from	a	project	or	programme	may	
be	appropriate;	if	the	planned	date	of	exit	coincides	with	a	time	when	other	sources	of	
funding	are	scarce	then,	depending	on	the	stage	and	needs	of	the	project,	exit	decisions	
may	need	to	be	re-considered.
The	way	in	which	community	foundation	fees	are	calculated	(on	capital	under	
management)	is	also	a	practice	that	works	well	in	boom	years	–	but	actually	bears	no	
relationship	to	the	value-added,	and	the	work,	of	the	foundation.
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6.1  what are we here for: the rainy Day 
that never Comes?
Foundations	have	not	ceased	to	be	wealthy.	Indeed	it	is	important	to	remember	that	
many	are	still	better	off	in	asset	values	than	they	were,	even	a	couple	of	years	ago.	The	
problem	for	foundations	is	not	that	they	do	not	have	money	–	they	do.	The	problem	is	
that	some	cannot,	by	the	terms	of	the	deed,	spend	the	accumulated	capital	they	have,	
and	those	that	may,	often	choose	not	to.	One	trustee	company	manager	who	was	
interviewed	estimated	that	around	10%	of	the	trusts	under	management	were	permitted	
to	spend	capital	and	only	about	one	third	of	that	10%	would	actually	do	so.
The	pros	and	cons	of	the	perpetuity	debate	are	complicated.	On	the	one	hand	there	are	
those	who	believe	that	‘Capital	is	the	goose	that	lays	the	golden	eggs’	–	and	the	figures	
prove	it.	
Those	in	favour	of	spending	capital	as	well	as	income	argue	that	the	‘golden	eggs’	need	
to	be	set	in	the	context	of	inflation,	opportunity	costs,	fees	and	so	on.	They	might	also	
argue	that	the	problems	are	here	and	now	and	spending	as	much	as	we	can	now	is	more	
cost	effective	than	waiting	for	things	to	get	worse	(or	at	best	not	improve	while	solutions	
become	more	costly	due	to	inflation).	If	your	concern	is	the	environment	or	medical	
issues	why	would	you	wait	until	next	year	to	give	all	you	have	to	addressing	that	issue,	
fiddling	while	Rome	burns?	Or,	more	pragmatically,	they	might	argue	that	it’s	a	matter	of	
timing	as	does,	for	example,	Paul	Clitheroe	(2009	cited	in	Arkles	2009:23):	‘I’m	actually	
better	off	increasing	my	level	of	grantmaking	over	the	next	few	years	than	worrying	about	
building	the	corpus.’	As	a	living	donor,	Paul	Clitheroe	is,	of	course,	in	a	different	position	
from	trustees	of	estate	legacies.	
In	important	ways	the	different	issues	of	maintaining	the	real	value	(but	not	accumulating)	
capital	and	perpetuity	come	down	to	a	question	underlying	everything	foundations	do	–	
what	are	we	here	for?
Bill	Gates	gives	one	answer.	In	2008	the	Bill	and	Melinda	Gates	Foundation	gave	out	
$3.3.billion:	
	 	 ‘In	2009	instead	of	reducing	this	amount,	we	are	choosing	to	increase	it	to	$3.8	
billion,	which	is	about	7	per	cent	of	our	assets.	Although	spending	at	this	level	will	
reduce	the	assets	more	quickly,	the	goal	of	our	foundation	is	to	make	investments	
whose	payback	to	society	is	very	high	rather	than	to	pay	out	the	minimum	to	make	
the	endowment	last	as	long	as	possible’	(Gates	2009).
For	a	variety	of	reasons	now	may	be	as	good	a	time	as	any	to	debate	the	notion	of	
perpetuity.	This	is	not	to	suggest	that	there	are	no	advantages	in	perpetuity	–	there	are.	It	
is	simply	to	make	the	point	that	we	need	to	be	clear	about	the	costs	and	the	benefits.
As	Bruce	Bonyhady	(2008	cited	in	Anderson	2009:2)	has	suggested,	now	is	a	chance	to	
make	this:	
	 	 ‘the	opening	of	a	new	chapter	in	Australia’s	philanthropic	history,	one	in	which	our	
response	to	crisis	is	not	to	hold	back	or	to	stifle	innovation	but	to	find	new	and	
creative	ways	to	navigate	through	difficult	economic	and	social	circumstances	with	
courage,	wisdom,	passion	and	purpose.’
ConClusion6
26
Anderson,	G.	(2009)	‘Philanthropy	in	hard	times’	Australian	Philanthropy	72:2.
Anheier,	H.	and	D.	Leat	(2007)	Creative philanthropy.	London:Routledge.
Arkles,	L.	(2009)	‘Paul	Clitheroe’	Australian	Philanthropy	72:22–23.
Australian	Red	Cross	(2009)	Victorian	Bushfire	Appeal	Fund	Six	Month	Progress	Report.	
Melbourne:	Victorian	Bushfire	Appeal	Fund.
Bonyhady,	B.	(2008)	‘The	Future	of	Australian	Philanthropy:	New	Uncertainties	and	
Opportunities’	Philanthropy: Passion and Purpose, Philanthropy Australia Conference 
2008.	Melbourne:	16–17	October	2008.
Burke,	R.	(2009)	‘Change	is	afoot’	Australian	Philanthropy	72:8–9.
Charity	Commission	(2009)	Firm	Foundations:	A	snapshot	of	how	trusts	and	foundations	are	
responding	to	the	economic	downturn	in	2009.	London:	Charity	Commission.
De	Borms,	L.	(2005)	Foundations Creating Impact in a Globalised World. London: John Wiley 
and Sons.
Gates,	B.	(2009)	2009	Annual	Letter	from	Bill	Gates:	The	Economic	Crisis.	Available	from	
www.gatesfoundation.org/annual-letter/2009/Pages/2009-economic-crisis.aspx. 
Accessed November 2009.
Kennedy,	S.	(2009)	Australia’s	response	to	the	global	financial	crisis:	A	speech	to	the	Australia	
Israel	Leadership	Forum.	Available	at	www.treasury.gov.au/documents/1576/PDF/
Australia_ Israel_Leadership_Forum_by_Steven_Kennedy.pdf. Accessed November 
2009.
Kernot,	C.	2009.	‘Government	support	for	the	Third	Sector’	Australian	Philanthropy	72:10.
referenCes7
CONTACT INFORMATION
The Australian Centre for 
Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies 
Queensland University of Technology
Phone +61 7 3138 1020 
Email acpns@qut.edu.au 
Website: www.cpns.bus.qut.edu.au 
GPO Box 2434 BRISBANE 
QLD Australia 4001 
CRICOS code: 00213J
©
 Q
U
T 
2
0
0
8 
P
ro
d
u
ce
d
 b
y 
Q
U
T 
P
u
b
lic
at
io
ns
 1
6
8
6
4
Australian Foundations 
and the Downturn
Queensland University of Technology
The Australian Centre for Philanthropy 
and Nonprofit Studies
April 2010
DR DIANA leAT
